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Abstract 
During the Cold War, Japan seldom showed an interest in the political conditions in aid 
recipients. However, after the Cold War, Japan has been actively imposing negative aid 
sanctions (the suspension or a decrease in foreign aid) on recipient countries where 
undesirable policy changes occur, while positive aid sanctions (an increase in foreign 
aid) would be applied to aid recipients that conduct desirable polices in the light of 
Japan’s ODA Charter. Overall, from 1986 to 2002, two trends can be observed in 
Japan’s aid sanctions policy. First, the Japanese government refrained from taking strict 
measures against countries that maintain strong economic and diplomatic relations with 
Japan. Second, even if Tokyo did take punitive measure against those countries it 
softened its stance as soon as a convenient pretext could be found. All this indicates that 
policymakers in Tokyo still give priority to Japan’s economic interests.  
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1. Introduction 
During the Cold War, Japan seldom showed an interest in the political conditions in aid 
recipients. However, after the Cold War, Japan has been actively imposing negative aid 
sanctions (the suspension or a decrease in foreign aid) on recipient countries where 
undesirable policy changes occur, while positive aid sanctions (an increase in foreign aid) 
would be applied to aid recipients that conduct desirable polices in the light of Japan’s 
ODA Charter.  
 
In the 1990s, Japan adopted new aid guidelines with the aim of promoting the “universal 
values” of human rights and democracy through her foreign aid. By doing this, Japan was 
showing willingness to contribute to the creation of a new world order based on those 
values. In 1991, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced the “Four Guidelines of ODA”. 
In the following year, under Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, Japan’s “ODA Charter” 
was officially inaugurated. The fourth principle in the ODA Charter proclaims that Japan 
will observe the conditions of human rights and democracy in the recipient countries 
when disbursing foreign aid, noting that: 
   
Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratisation and introduction 
             of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human 
             rights and freedom in the recipient countries (MOFA, 1993: 33).  
 
After the introduction of the ODA Charter, the Japanese government began using foreign 
aid to influence political situations in developing countries. In cases where aid-receiving 
countries have not followed Japan’s advice on improving their political situation, the 
Japanese government was prepared to take stern actions and totally or partially suspend 
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economic assistance.  
 
For example, when pro-democracy rallies broke out in Kenya in 1991 and political chaos 
ensued, Japan suspended her aid which financed Kenya’s current account deficits. 
Conversely, if aid recipients made desirable moves in the light of the ODA Charter, Japan 
would show support and increase amounts of foreign aid. For instance, when Myanmar’s 
democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995, Japan 
announced an additional bilateral grant to Myanmar worth ¥1.6 billion (approximately 
US$17 million) to rebuild a nursing school in Yangon (Furuoka, 2005).           
 
Criticisms that the Japanese government disregards political conditions in aid-receiving 
countries persist. Many observers still doubt that the Japanese government is really 
prepared to implement strict aid sanctions to improve human rights practices in 
developing countries.  
 
Rix notices that the political uses of foreign aid have become more prominent and Japan 
has been rewarding those countries that adopt liberal values. However, he adds, “This 
does not yet mean … that aid is withheld from countries not holding to these principles” 
(Rix, 1993: 172).  
 
A leader of Amnesty International points out that Japan is one of the biggest donors of 
foreign aid but it is difficult for an outsider to understand the mechanism of the 
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promotion of human rights through Japan’s ODA (Gaiko Foramu, January 1995: 64-69). 
 
The fundamental question is: can the Japanese government enforce the principles of the 
new aid guidelines in an impartial manner? The question is especially pertinent 
considering that Japan has been repeatedly criticised for taking lenient measures toward 
aid recipients in Asia (see Arase, 1993 and Okuizumi, 1995). Another question is: does 
Japan practice a double standard in the application of the new aid guidelines? 
  
2. Positive and Negative Aid Sanctions    
To understand Japan’s aid sanctions policy, the Japanese way of imposing aid sanctions 
needs to be taken into account. The Japanese government justifies its dealings with 
repressive regimes by stressing the importance of the “persuasive approach” practiced by 
Japan. According to Japan’s ODA 1994, “The policy dialogue pursued by Japan is 
unique in that Japan does not apply its standards automatically to the planning of 
development projects... This stance putting emphasis on policy dialogue is reflected in 
the ODA Charter” (MOFA, 1994: 53). 
 
In a similar vein, Japan’s ODA 1995 states that when problems contravening the 
principles of the ODA Charter occur, it is important to listen to explanations of recipient 
countries and hold dialogues with them. The document thus describes Tokyo’s methods, 
“The Japanese approach is to work tenaciously on the recipient countries toward 
achieving the goal through friendly persuasion and quiet and patient diplomacy” (MOFA, 
1995: 47). 
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As can be seen from the above statements, the Japanese government uses its aid power to 
influence aid recipients not only by employing negative aid sanctions but also through the 
use of the positive aid sanctions. In other words, Japan can choose to impose negative aid 
sanctions on recipient countries where undesirable policy changes occur, while positive 
aid sanctions would be applied to aid recipients that conduct desirable polices in the light 
of Japan’s ODA Charter (Furuoka, 2006). 
 
The Japanese government admits that it prefers to use positive aid sanctions. According 
to Japan’s ODA 1995, Tokyo adopts positive aid sanctions with the aim of encouraging 
recipient countries that show signs of improvement in such areas as democratisation, 
human rights and restraints in military expenditure. By contrast, Japan employs negative 
aid sanctions when political situations in recipient countries are viewed as undesirable in 
the light of Japan’s ODA Charter (MOFA, 1995: 48). 
 
From the Japanese government’s perspective, positive aid sanctions is more practical and 
effective than negative aid sanctions. The Japanese government explains its preference 
for the use of positive aid sanctions by stating that negative aid sanctions can backfire 
and thus retard the movement toward improvement. Besides, the use of negative aid 
sanctions may create an impression that Japan is trying to impose its values on aid 
recipients (MOFA, 1995: 48). 
 
Japan’s ODA 1996 mentions that problems that may arise with the implementation of 
negative aid sanctions. The document claims that even if the recipient country’s actions 
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are repugnant to the principles of Japan’s ODA Charter, it is not appropriate for Japan to 
cut off aid immediately because those actions might be dictated by the recipient’s 
security and are domestic matters. As the document explains, “Furthermore, there could 
be a case where both desirable and undesirable actions in the view of the ODA Charter 
co-exist in one country at the same time. In this case it would be inappropriate to pay 
attention solely to the negative events and reduce or freeze ODA disbursement” (MOFA, 
1996: 38-39). 
 
Japan’s ODA 1996 stresses the importance of recognizing the recipient countries’ efforts 
to improve their political situations and states, “As the aim of the ODA’s principles is to 
help recipient countries put the content of the principles into practice, it is necessary to 
encourage them to embrace the principles as a value worth of pursuit of their own accord 
and urge them to make efforts for its realisation”. The Japanese government thus explains 
why Japan avoids imposing its own values on aid recipients, “If Japan takes strict actions 
to recipient countries... it may be viewed by the latter as a unilateral imposition of values, 
provoke a backlash, and delay improvements in the situation. When there emerges in a 
recipient country a move repugnant to the spirit or the principles (of the ODA Charter), it 
is important to have bilateral dialogue or to bring international influence in collaboration 
with other countries rather than unilaterally tamper with ODA projects” (MOFA, 1996: 
38-39).  
 
The question is whether Japan’s preference for positive aid sanctions is effective or 
desirable. There are contradicting views on the practice of dealing with repressive 
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regimes through positive aid sanctions. For example, a leading Japanese economic 
journal praised Japan’s initiative in Myanmar, calling it “Sun diplomacy”. Using an 
analogy of Aesop’s fable about a wager between the north wind and the sun, the article 
compared the US approach (negative reinforcement) to the north wind while Japan’s 
policy (positive reinforcement) was equated with the sun. According to the journal, 
Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts and contacts with the Myanmar military government 
contributed to the release of Aung San Su Kyi (Ekonomisuto, June 18, 1996: 17).  
 
A Japanese ODA specialist, Wataru Hosaka, gives an altogether different analysis of the 
same event. He states that the use of Aesop’s fable was not very successful and could 
neither explain nor justify Japan’s policy toward Myanmar. Hosaka points out that it is 
unacceptable that the Japanese people’s taxes are spent on a repressive regime and warns 
that such policies will render “nominal” the ODA Charter’s principles (Kokusai Kaihatsu 
Janaru, February. 1996: 26-27). 
 
2.1. Positive Aid Sanctions 
Although the Japanese government has more frequently employed positive aid sanctions 
since the ODA Charter’s introduction in 1992, a prototype of this method had existed 
before the announcement of the new aid guidelines. According to Inada (1995: 5), 
Japan’s active assistance to the new government of the Philippines, after President 
Marcos was ousted in 1986, can be considered the first case of the application of positive 
reinforcement. 
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Since the introduction of the new aid guidelines, Tokyo applied positive aid sanctions 
provided foreign aid to three Latin American countries, Nicaragua (1991), El Salvador 
(1991) and Peru (1992). These nations had a long history of civil disorder and had 
struggled to establish more democratic political systems (Furuoka, 2007a).  
 
Positive aid sanctions were also employed in Africa in Madagascar (1991), Zambia 
(1992) and Guinea (1992) (Furuoka, 2007b). In Asia, positive reinforcement was used in 
Mongolia (1992), Cambodia (1992), the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union 
(1992), and Vietnam (1993) (see Furuoka, 2007c). 
 
2.2. Negative Aid Sanctions 
The Japanese government is usually very prudent in applying negative reinforcement and 
resorts to it only if persuasion does not work. According to Orr (1993: 14), when serious 
human rights abuses take place in a recipient country or there is a serious setback in 
democracy (especially, a military coup d'etat), Tokyo takes the following three steps: 1) 
persuasion, 2) persuasion plus soft measures, 3) aid cuts.  
 
In the initial stage, Japan expresses concern about the situation and warns the recipient 
country of possible punitive measures. Tokyo uses diplomatic channels to persuade a 
recipient to improve the negative situation. If there are no signs of improvement after the 
first warning, the Japanese government issues the second warning. If the negative 
situation persists, Japan normally freezes the amount of foreign aid at the previous year’s 
level. Finally, if this measure also fails, the Japanese government reduces or suspends 
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foreign aid to the country. 
 
Since the introduction of the new guidelines in 1991, Tokyo has reviewed foreign aid to 
nine African countries, i.e. Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi (1992), Sudan (1992), 
Sierra Leone (1992), Togo (1993), Zambia (1993), Nigeria (1994), and the Gambia 
(1994). In Latin America, Japan used negative reinforcement in Haiti (1991) and 
Guatemala (1993). It is worth noting that, in the 1980s before the ODA Charter was 
promulgated, Japan had taken similar measures towards two Asian countries, i.e. Burma 
(1988) and China (1989) (see Furuoka, 2006).  
 
3. Japan’s Aid Sanction Policy from 1986 to 2002  
From 1986 to 2002, there were twelve cases of positive aid sanctions employed by the 
Japanese government. As Table 1 indicates, the following countries were involved: in 
Latin America, Nicaragua (1991), El Salvador (1991) and Peru (1992); in Africa, 
Madagascar (1991), Zambia (1992), Guinea (1992) and South Africa (1997); in Asia, 
Mongolia (1992), Cambodia (1992), Vietnam (1993), the Central Asian countries (1993) 
(Furuoka, 2005).  
 
Although positive sanctions have been geographically evenly implemented, an obvious 
distortion in the use of negative reinforcement can be observed. From 1988 to 2002, there 
have been fifteen cases when Japan used negative aid sanctions. As Table 2 shows Japan 
employed negative aid sanctions against repressive regimes in 11 African countries, i.e. 
Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi (1992), Sudan (1992), Sierra Leone (1992), Togo 
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(1993), Zambia (1993), Nigeria (1994), the Gambia (1994), Niger (1996), and Côte 
d’Ivoire (2000). Japan used negative aid sanctions against repressive regime in two Latin 
American countries, i.e. Haiti (1991) and Guatemala (1993) and two Asian countries, i.e. 
Myanmar (1988) and China (1989) (Furuoka, 2005).  
 
Japan should have imposed negative reinforcement on other four countries --Indonesia, 
Peru, Thailand and Cambodia -- but refrained from doing so for one reason or another 
(see Table 3). In Cambodia, Tokyo was able to improve the political situation without 
cutting foreign aid. Japan’s policies toward Indonesia, Peru and Thailand were more 
controversial. The violations of human rights in those countries had been serious enough 
to warrant a review of aid policy. In 1992, the Freedom House’s Human Rights Index for 
Indonesia was “six” which indicated that grave violations of human rights had taken 
place in that country (Furuoka, 2006).  
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Table 1 
Positive Aid Sanctions (1986-2002) 
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index 
Area 
1.The Philippines 1986 To assist the new 
government and its efforts at 
economic stabilisation 
Four (1986) 
 
Asia 
2. Nicaragua 1991 To assist in national 
reconstruction efforts 
Three (1991) Latin America 
3. El Salvador 1991 To assist in national 
reconstruction efforts 
Three (1991) Latin America 
4. Madagascar 1991 To assist the general 
elections 
Four (1991) 
 
Africa 
5. Peru 1992 To assist elections for 
Constitutional Assembly   
Six (1992) Latin America 
6. Zambia 1992 To assist privatisation and 
industrial reform 
Two (1992) 
 
Africa 
7. Guinea 1992 To assist the general election Six (1992) 
 
Africa 
8. Mongolia 1992 To assist transition to market 
economy 
Three(1992) 
 
Asia 
9. Cambodia 1992 To  assist in national 
reconstruction efforts  
Six (1992) Asia 
10.Asian 
Republics of the 
former USSR 
1992 To assist transition to market 
economy 
Kazakhstan  
“five” (1992) 
Kyrgyzstan 
“four” (1992) 
Tajikistan 
“six” (1992) 
Uzbekistan 
“six” (1992) 
Turkmenistan 
“seven” 
(1992) 
 
Central Asia 
11. Vietnam 1993 To assist transition to market 
economy 
Seven (1992) Asia 
12. South Africa 1997 To assist democratisation 
process  
Four (1993) Africa 
America 
Note: Freedom House Index of political rights is used to measure the human rights condition in recipient 
countries. The index uses a one-to-seven scale and assigns higher numbers to countries with worse human 
rights conditions.  
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Table 2 
Negative Aid Sanctions (1986-2002) 
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index 
Area 
1. Myanmar 1988 Aid suspension 
(Aid partially resumed in 
1995) 
Seven 
(1988) 
Seven 
(1995) 
Asia 
2. China 1989 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1991) 
Seven 
(1989) 
Seven 
(1991) 
Asia 
3. Kenya 1991 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1993) 
Six (1991) 
Five (1993) 
Africa 
4. Zaire 1991 Aid suspension Six (1991) Africa 
5. Haiti 1991 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1994) 
Seven 
(1991) 
Five (1994) 
Latin America 
6. Malawi 1992 Reduction of aid  
(Aid restitution in 1994) 
Six (1992) 
Two (1994) 
Africa 
7. Sudan 1992 Aid suspension 
 
Seven 
(1992) 
Africa 
8. Guatemala 1993 Aid suspension Four (1993) Latin America 
9. Sierra Leone 1993 Aid suspension 
 
Seven 
(1993) 
Africa 
10. Zambia 1993 Aid suspension Three 
(1993) 
Africa 
11. Togo 1993 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1996) 
Seven 
(1993) 
Six (1996) 
Africa 
12. Nigeria 1994 Aid suspension 
 
Seven 
(1994) 
Africa 
13. The Gambia 1994 Aid suspension 
 
Seven 
(1994) 
Africa 
14. Niger 1996 Aid suspension Seven 
(1996) 
Africa 
15. Côte d’Ivoire 2000 Aid suspension Six (2000) Africa 
Note: Freedom House Index of political rights is used to measure the human rights condition in recipient 
countries. The index uses a one-to-seven scale and assigns higher numbers to countries with worse human 
rights conditions.  
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Table 3 
List of countries where Japan employed no aid sanctions  
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index 
Area 
1. Indonesia 1991 No aid suspension Six (1991) 
Six (1992) 
Asia 
2. Thailand 1991 No aid suspension Two (1990) 
Six (1991) 
Asia 
3. Peru 1991 No aid suspension Three 
(1991) 
Six (1992) 
Latin America 
4. Cambodia 1997 No aid suspension Six (1996) 
Seven 
(1997) 
Asia 
 
Note: Freedom House Index of political rights is used to measure the human rights condition in recipient 
countries. The index uses a one-to-seven scale and assigns higher numbers to countries with worse human 
rights conditions.  
 
 
The human rights situations in Thailand and Peru deteriorated in 1991 after the military 
coup d’etats in those countries. The human rights index for Thailand fell from “two” in 
1990 to “six” in 1991. For Peru, the index dropped from “three” in 1991 to “six” in 1992.   
     
The Japanese government was expected to cut foreign aid to Indonesia, Peru and 
Thailand, especially in the light of the new aid guidelines. However, Japan chose to give 
priority to her own economic, commercial and diplomatic interests and was unwilling to 
sacrifice those for the sake of human rights and democracy. 
 
It should be noted that when the Japanese government yields to international pressures 
and imposes aid sanctions on a country that represents considerable economic interests, 
or has special relations with Japan, Tokyo will resume aid as soon as it finds the slightest 
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convenient pretext to do so, even if there are no concrete signs of improvement. For 
example, in 1988, Japan imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar. At the time, the 
human rights index for the country was “seven”. In 1995, the Japanese government 
resumed partially ODA to Myanmar despite the fact that the human rights index 
remained unchanged. In China, Japan suspended foreign aid in 1989 (the human rights 
index was “seven”), but resumed ODA in 1991 (the human rights index remained at 
“seven”). 
 
In short, two trends can be observed in Japan’s aid sanctions policy. First, the Japanese 
government takes more lenient measures to the countries that have strong economic ties 
with Japan. Those are mainly Asian countries. Second, the Japanese government may 
take punitive measure against the countries that represent strong economic interests for 
Japan, but will resume aid as soon as possible. This proves that the decision makers of 
Japanese aid sanctions policy assign top priority to Japan’s economic interests.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The Japanese government prefers to use the method of positive aid sanctions rather than 
negative aid sanctions, claiming the former to be more effective in reaching policy goals. 
Policymakers in Tokyo maintain that negative aid sanctions can backfire and retard 
democratic movements in aid recipients. Putting aside official explanations, the facts 
show that Japan avoids taking stern actions when human rights abuses occur in Asia. 
Special treatment of Japan’s important economic partners in Asia may be the real reason 
for Tokyo’s preference for the use of positive aid sanctions. The Japanese government 
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did not take punitive measures against several countries, such as China, Indonesia, Peru 
and Thailand when grave human rights violations happened, because suspending aid 
could seriously hurt Japan’s economic interests.  
 
When the new aid guidelines were adopted in 1991, the Japanese government promised 
to rigorously apply those to promote “universal values”. In practice, the principles were 
often sacrificed for the sake of economic interests. Apparently, Japan pledges to promote 
human rights and democracy with the aim of showing solidarity with other aid donor 
countries while the pursuit of economic interests remains the main driving force behind 
Japanese aid policy.  
 
Overall, two trends can be observed in Japan’s aid sanctions policy. First, the Japanese 
government refrained from taking strict measures against countries that maintain strong 
economic and diplomatic relations with Japan. Second, even if Tokyo did take punitive 
measure against those countries it softened its stance as soon as a convenient pretext 
could be found. All this indicates that policymakers in Tokyo still give priority to Japan’s 
economic interests.  
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